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REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND INFORMALITY:  
AN ANALYSIS BASED ON SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
1. Introduction 
The informal economy has been occupying a key position in the development-discourse 
ever since it was ‘discovered’ in the Ghana in the second half of the 20th century. A good 
deal of literature has grown up in the past forty years with efforts to ‘formalize’ the 
concept of informality and to integrate it with mainstream development economic theory. 
Unfortunately however, informal economy has not yet received the kind of treatment that 
it was entitled to (Marjit and Kar, 2011) given the fact that the informal economy forms a 
cushion to the otherwise unemployed workforce (more precisely those who do not 
manage to secure formal employment) and allows for a much needed breathing space for 
the majority of the workers in developing economies; in the past decade almost 60 
percent of workers of the developing world found income opportunities in the informal 
economy (ILO-WTO 2009). Traditionally, persistent informality can be found in 
developing countries ranging between 25 percent to more than 90 percent. ILO figures 
indicate that in recent years informal employment was around 90 percent in India and 
around 96 percent in Mali. However, assuming all jobs in developed economies to be 
formal would be fallacious. Even in developed nations informal employment accounts for 
roughly 10 percent of the total employment. 
 
While it is evident that the informal economy employs almost three-fourths of the labor 
population in the developing world, it must also be pointed out that the informal 
economy, by and large, comprises of economic units and workers that remain outside the 
world of regulated activities and protected employment relationships (Chen, 2007). 
According to Hart (2006), the label ‘informal’ may be popular because it is both positive 
and negative. To act informally is to be free and flexible; but the term also says what 
people are not doing—not wearing conventional dress, and not being regulated by the 
state. According to Ray (1998), informal firms and businesses may not be illegal in the 
strict sense, but there is a shadowy penumbra within which they live. It is difficult to 
implement the rule that a peanut vendor pay his taxes, in part because it is impossible to 
ascertain how much he earns.  Loyaza (1994) claims that the informal sector, however, 
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face the disadvantages of working outside the legal system. Maiti and Sen (2010) label 
this aspect of the informal economy as ‘means of exploitation’—a site unfettered by the 
regulations and social norms of fairness governing pay and work conditions that are more 
at play in the formal sector. According to such a view, the inherently exploitative nature 
of the informal sector stems directly out of the flexibility associated with the notion of 
informality. The unregulated informal economy thus manifests itself in underpayment of 
workers, violation of minimum wage laws, abysmal working conditions and lack of 
mechanism of workers voicing their concerns to their employers. Marjit and Kar (2011) 
claim that such violation of labor laws causes ‘informal’ production to be labeled 
‘illegal’. 
 
This dual nature of the informal economy (on one hand it serves as a buffer to the 
workers who do not get absorbed in the formal economy and on the other hand it is a site 
unfettered by law where injustice is rampant) is in fact the root of all controversies and 
debate relating to the aspect of governance. What should be the appropriate policy 
response to informality? Should it be left on its own or should the state intervene in the 
functioning of the informal sector? If the state needs to regulate the informal sector, what 
instruments of regulation can it possibly put to use? One view assumes informal economy 
to be a ‘little people’s alternative’: in developing countries, it is opinionated that, in 
absence of social welfare system and given the high incidence of poverty, a democratic 
state may use the informal sector as a buffer for the poor people by channelizing informal 
jobs as an effective redistributive mechanism which is often referred to as ‘development 
through the backdoor’ (Marjit and Kar, 2011). An alternative theory, however, highlights 
the unregulated aspect of the informal sector which point out the miserable plight of the 
agents who operate in the ambit of informality and demand the government’s role to be 
something more than a passive player. Given the fact that the informal economy is here to 
stay (Chen 2007), what is needed is an appropriate policy response in form of 
intervention of the government to a certain degree. Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006) 
however cautions against the over-reaction of the state. Since there exists a strong 
association of irregularity with unstructured, the state often has a strong impetus for 
interventions that often have adverse results. While ‘legalizing’ the ‘extra-legal’ (De 
Soto, 2000) may be a perfectly desirable proposition, the reach of official governance and 
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the degree of structuring must be specified and made précis since it is often observed that 
regulations tend to impose rigidity and distort the incentives for factor reallocation, 
capital accumulation, competition, and innovation (Loyaza et al., 2005). 
 
Given that regulation aimed to check the levels of informality almost every time end up 
yielding the adverse results (regulation often seems to boost informal employment), it is 
often claimed that improving the quality of regulations and introducing more flexibility in 
the system would help policy makers realize their goal. However, whether the 
introducing flexibility in the regulation system by itself will act as an incentive to 
formalize or whether its impact on informal employment is contingent upon some other 
factors are open questions in the literature of informal economy; the exact dynamics 
between governance, regulation, enforcement and informal economy yet remain 
unexplored to a great extent. 
 
Recent literature on informal labour market has focused on the impact of regulation on 
informality. Kanbur (2009), Loyaza et al. (2006), Chen (2005), Schneider (2001) etc. 
have discussed on this aspect from various angles and have concluded that the impact of 
regulation is largely contingent upon institutional capacities and the desire and the 
capability to enforce the same. This paper draws on these observations and provides a 
formal econometric model of regulation and enforcement. Based on empirical data, the 
paper tries to capture the dynamics between the level of governance and informal 
employment 
 
The purpose of the present study is to show that that regulation by itself has no role in 
reducing or aggravating the level of informality in an economy. Regulation will only 
affect levels of informality when it is enforced. Thus, a country might have flexible 
labour, business and credit market regulations with the aim of arresting the size of the 
informal sector (assuming the rigidity in regulation serves as a disincentive to formalize) 
but may totally fail to do so if the enforcement authority is incapable in enforcing the 
laws. For instance, regulations aimed at abandoning the licensing system (in which 
corruption is inherent) will provide incentive to entrepreneurs to start business in the 
ambit of the formal sector only when they are assured that licensing system does not get 
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replaced by corruption and bribery owing to biased legal system and judiciary. In other 
words, we argue that regulations aimed at adding flexibility into the system (and thereby 
containing informality) will only be meaningful if enforced properly. In addition, we also 
claim that all types of regulation (when enforced) may not affect informal employment in 
the same way. In fact some types of regulation may even turn out to be insignificant to 
reduce informality, thus, revealing the policy instruments that the government can 
enforce to tackle the problems of informality. 
 
In this study, our objective is to explore the inter-relationship among regulation, 
enforcement and the level of informal employment for different countries across the 
world. Using secondary data collected for 46 countries from different sub-continents over 
the period between 1980 and 2008 the dissertation establishes that regulations by 
themselves have no significant impact on informal employment. However, in the 
presence of interaction between enforcement and regulation, the same regulatory 
variables which earlier were found to be insignificant turns out to be significant along 
with the interaction variables. In addition, it is observed that while regulation itself may 
be related to informal employment in a certain way, enforcement of the same regulation 
alters the relationship.  
 
The dissertation has been organized as follows: based on the existing literature, the 
second section provides the theoretical foundations of the concept of informality. The 
third section entails the research objective. This is followed by the theories on regulation 
and enforcement and their relation to informal employment. The fifth section provides a 
brief idea regarding data and research methodology. This is followed by two sections 
based on empirical findings: summary statistics and regression analysis. Finally, the 
study is concluded giving some policy implications.  
 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
The exact nature of the informal sector is not well documented. Different opinions on 
informality and it’s relation with the formal counterpart further aggravates the problem of 
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conceptualizing the informal sector. A plethora of definitions used by academicians and 
international agencies to characterize the informal economy has made the distinction 
between the formal and informal economy rather hazy. This section presents a glimpse of 
the existing literature that has grown up in the last fifty years, the concepts of formality 
and informality as well as a brief documentation of the recent attempts made by 
international agencies to formally define the concept of informality. In addition to 
reviewing conceptual issues related to informality, this section also attempts to review the 
literature that highlights the linkages between the informal economy and regulation with 
special emphasis on the enforcement aspect. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
The classical theory of development asserted that with the process of capitalist 
development, economic agents operating in the backward sector of the two sector 
economy would eventually get absorbed in the modern sector and hence over time the 
traditional sector would disappear. The theory relied heavily on the twin assumptions of 
the traditional sector holding a vast pool of surplus labour and that the modern sector was 
capable of expanding relentless thereby absorbing the entire pool of this surplus labour 
(Lewis, 1954). That this view was extremely over-optimistic was proved in the mid-
1960s, when it was evident that in many developing countries, planned economic 
development did not create enough modern jobs to reduce unemployment or erode the 
traditional sector. Optimisms about development facilitating a situation of full 
employment gave way to concerns about persistent unemployment in developing nations. 
This issue was brought into the framework of equilibrium economics more explicitly by 
Harris and Todaro (1970). They recognized that the dynamics of rural-urban migration 
would manifest itself in the form of a pool of unemployed workers but failed to recognize 
that whether open unemployment for the poor was not at all a sustainable proposition—a 
rickshaw puller or a porter cannot afford to remain unemployed for long (Marjit and Kar, 
2011). A more realistic modeling of the economic dualism that Lewis (1954) and Harris 
and Todaro (1970) would perhaps then demand the inclusion of a third sector in form of 
urban informal sector (Fields, 1975; Ray, 1998).  
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The fact that the losers from the process of capitalistic development could not remain 
unemployed for long and had do ‘something’ which would fetch them livelihood was 
given formal recognition for the first time in development studies by Hart (1973) and 
International Labour Office (ILO) Mission to Kenya (ILO, 1972) with the introduction of 
the concept of informality. It was explicitly recognized that an economy—a rather 
informal one—had been functioning beyond the ambit of the formal economy, almost 
functioning as a survival mechanism for the poor having no formal jobs. Hart (2006) in a 
recent view mentions that economic conditions that prevailed in the Third World cities 
(very widespread formal unemployment was rampant) in 1970s were much different from 
that perceived. ‘Their streets were teeming with life, a constantly shifting crowd of 
hawkers, porters, taxi-drivers, beggars, pimps, pickpockets, hustlers—all of them getting 
by without the benefit of a real job’ (Hart, 2006). On recounting his experience in Ghana 
in 1971, Hart (2006) claims: 
“The main message of the paper (Hart, 1973) was that the Accra’s 
poor were not ‘unemployed’. They worked, often casually, for 
erratic and generally low returns; but were definitely 
working…Following Weber (1981)1 I argued that the ability to 
stabilize economic activity within a bureaucratic form made 
returns more calculable and regular for the workers as well as their 
bosses. That stability was in turn guaranteed by the state’s laws, 
which only extended so far into the depths of Ghana’s economy. 
‘Formal’ incomes came from regulated economic activities and 
‘informal’ incomes, both legal and illegal, lay beyond the scope of 
regulation”. 
 
Reflecting this concern, the International Labour Organization (ILO) mounted a series of 
large multi-disciplinary “employment missions” to various countries. The first 
comprehensive ILO employment Mission to Africa was to Kenya in 1972 (ILO 1972)2. 
Through its field work, and in its Official report, the Kenya mission recognized that the 
                                               
1 Weber, M. (1981), General Economic History, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
2 It must be noted that the term ‘informal sector’ did not originate with the foreign experts in the ILO 
Mission although they helped popularize it. The term was coined in 1971 by Keith Hart in his study of 
informal income opportunities in urban Ghana (Hart, 1973). 
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traditional sector, what it called the informal sector, had not just persisted but expanded; 
that the informal sector was not confined to marginally productive activities but included 
profitable and efficient enterprises; and that informal sector activities were largely 
ignored, rarely supported, often regulated, and sometimes actively discouraged by policy 
makers and governments. 
 
Kanbur (2009) notes that in the decades that followed, Hart’s term was taken up rapidly 
by development studies and by international agencies, which began to codify the 
definition of informality. Subsequent efforts aimed at formalizing the very concept of 
informality led to a plethora of competing (and even conflicting in some cases) 
definitions of the informal sector. That there is no clear definition of the concept of 
informality that could be consistently applied across the whole range of theoretical, 
empirical and policy analyses has ultimately added to the informal economy made the 
concept of informality a fuzzy one (Blunch et al., 2001). Instead ‘the formal and informal 
are better thought of as metaphors that conjure up a mental picture of whatever the user 
has in mind at that particular time’ (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006, p. 3). Sindzingre (2006) 
show that a wide range of terms including non-observed, irregular, unofficial, second, 
hidden, shadow, parallel, subterranean, informal, cash economy, black market, 
unmeasured, unrecorded, untaxed, non-structured, petty production and unorganized have 
been used to describe the concept of informality. Mogensen at al. (1995, p. 5) posit that a 
precise definition seems quite difficult, if not impossible, as “the informal economy 
develops all the time according to the ‘principle of running water’: it adjusts to changes 
in taxes, to sanctions from the tax authorities and to general moral attitudes”. 
 
One commonly used working definition of the informal sector is: all currently 
unregistered economic activities which contribute to the officially calculated (or 
observed) Gross National Product (Schneider, 2001; Benjamin and MBAYE, 2010).  
Loayza (1994) states that while the formal sector comprises of economic units that 
comply with regulations and taxes, the informal sector, by and large, evades onerous 
regulations but faces the disadvantage of working outside the legal system. Sindzingre 
(2006) extends the working definition of informal sector to include ‘unregulated labour 
intensive activities, self-employed entrepreneurs, micro and small enterprises, activities 
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that take place outside the state regulations.’ Following this populist classification, Ray 
(1998) describes urban informal sector in the following lines: 
“The urban informal sector is a loose amalgam of (usually small-
scale) organizations that escape the cover of many of these 
regulations and do not receive access to privileged facilities. The 
informal sector usually does not adhere to norms of minimum 
wages, retirement plans, or unemployment compensation. They do 
not pat taxes and receive little government support. These firms or 
businesses are not illegal in the strict sense, but there is a shadowy 
penumbra within which they live, and it is often convenient for the 
government to look the other way. It is difficult to implement the 
rule that a peanut vendor pay his taxes, in part because it is 
impossible to ascertain how much he earns…Setup costs are 
relatively low: the business or trade is usually small scale, and 
license fees and advance tax payments are unnecessary (although 
the occasional bribe may be needed).” 
 
2.2 Defining Informality 
As pointed out by Sindzingre, the fuzziness of the concept of informality was already 
highlighted in the 1970s. Overtime, the vagueness of the formal-informal economy has 
increased which has led Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006) to refer to the concept as 
‘increasingly heterogeneous phenomenon’. There is, thus, no single dichotomy between 
the formal and informal economy. However attempts have been made time and again to 
classify the competing ideas into broad groups. Following Chen (2005), Maiti and Sen 
(2010), the different views on informality can be classified into the following categories. 
 
2.2.1 DUALISTIC APPROACH 
The dualist school of thought is primarily based on the work of Lewis (1954) and Harris 
and Todaro (1970). The dualists view the informal sector as an inferior segment of the 
labour market with no direct links with its formal counterpart. According to this 
approach, the informal sector is primarily a residual sector—this sector existed because 
the modern sector had been growing at a slow rate thus being unable to generate 
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sufficient jobs to a portion of labour force (Maiti and Sen, 2010). With economic growth 
the informal sector is ultimately expected to be absorbed by the formal sector. 
 
2.2.2 STRUCTURALIST APPROACH 
The structuralist school of thought emphasizes the connections between the formal and 
informal sector. According to Moser (1978) and Portes et al. (1989) the informal sector 
comprises of micro firms and unregistered workers subordinated to large formal firms. 
This approach stresses on the fact that the large capitalistic firms get cheap labour and 
inputs from the informal sector which in turn increases the competitiveness of the large 
firms. In contrast to the dualistic view, the structuralist view posits growth will not serve 
to eliminate informal production relationships, which are intrinsically associated with 
capitalist development. In this view modern enterprises react to globalization by 
introducing more flexible productive systems and by outsourcing which allows them to 
cut their costs.  
 
2.2.3 LEGALISTIC APPROACH 
The legalist or orthodox school of thought stresses on evasion of regulations as one of the  
primary motives of operating informally. Epitomized by De Soto (1989), this approach 
claims that in deciding whether to operate formally or informally, micro-entrepreneurs 
will always perform a cost benefit analysis of the formalization. As long as costs of 
registration and other government procedures exceed the benefits of operating formally, 
these entrepreneurs will choose to operate informally. As such, informality could only be 
arrested if regulatory reforms and reductions in tax burden could be introduced. This 
approach thus highlights that growth will not necessarily eliminate the informal sector. 
The size of informality rather critically depends on the conditions of regulation and 
enforcement.  
 
Empirical research on informal economy over the last forty years has confirmed the fact 
that although the approaches cited above can explain the observed issues relating 
informality partially but fails to uncover fully the true dynamics underlying the working 
of the informal economy (ILO-WTO 2009). Thus, from the view point of successful 
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policy implementation what is thus need is a unifying approach that could integrate the 
competing views of informality. 
 
2.2.4 THE MULTI-SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET APPROACH: VIEWING 
INFORMALITY AS A CONTINUUM 
Way back Bromley (1978) and Lipton (1984) had highlighted the fact that it would be 
clearly oversimplification to assume the two sectors—formal and informal—to be 
distinct, each placed in a watertight compartment rather ‘there is a continuum’. In line 
with such arguments, an integrated approach is currently arising based on the idea of 
multi-segmented labour markets (Chen, 2005; Fields 2005). This school of thought 
combines the most appropriate elements of the dualist, legalist and structuralist 
approaches to explain different segments of the informal labour market. According to this 
theory the informal economy is segmented into three broad categories: a lower-tier 
segment dominated by households engaged in ‘survival activities’ with few links to the 
formal economy as suggested by the dualists;  an upper-tier segment dominated by small 
entrepreneurs who operate in the informal sector to avoid regulations and evade taxes as 
the legalists suggests; and an intermediate segment with small firms workers 
subordinated to larger firms, as suggested by the structuralists. The relative importance of 
each sector may, however, vary depending on the countries, make a particular view more 
relevant in explain the observed informality of that country. 
 
That informality is best described as a continuum by a combination of various criteria is 
also explicitly shown by Benjamin and MBAYE (2010). The criteria that they use to 
define informality are, namely, the size of activity criterion (whether firms employ more 
than five people or have sales of over 50 million CFA francs), the registration criterion 
(whether firms are registered with at least one administration), the existence of honest 
financial statements criterion (whether they are taxed through regular business income 
tax), the mobility of workplace criterion (whether they have a fixed domicile) and the 
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access to bank credit criterion(whether they had access to bank credit within the past five 
months)3. On the basis of these they distinguish between several levels of informality: 
 Level 0 of informality includes those firms that are completely informal. These firms 
are completely unknown to fiscal authorities. ‘They are small, do not have access to 
bank credit, are not subject to the regular business income tax, and are itinerant’. 
 Level 1 of informality includes those who are satisfies at least one of the five criteria 
defining formality. This level includes mainly those who are registered with an 
administration dealing with enterprises; who have more than 5 employees or who 
have gained access to bank credit within the previous 5 years. 
 Level 2 includes those economic entities that fulfill at least two of the five criteria 
defining formality. 
 Level 3 includes formal firms who fulfill all the five criteria of formality. 
 
These alternative representations of the informal economy improves upon the earlier and 
more crude dual sector depictions by allowing intermediate categories and movements 
along the overall continuum. 
 
2.2.5 FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF INFORMALITY: MAKING THEORETICAL 
CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL 
The diversity of views on the informal economy gets reflected in the variety of competing 
(and even conflicting in some cases) definitions that are put forward to explore its true 
dynamics. Based on the different views, international organizations have time and again 
tried to put forward a somewhat unified definition of the informal economy so as to 
render the concept operational. This section presents a selection of such 
conceptualizations that have been used by international bodies and traces the evolution of 
the operational definitions over time. 
 
In order to be consistent with the framework of the System of National Accounts and 
provide for a separate accounting of Gross Domestic Production (GDP) in the informal 
economy, in 1993, the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 
                                               
3 For a more detailed discussion on the various criteria defining formality see Benjamin and MBAYE 
(2010). 
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adopted a statistical definition of the informal sector in terms of economic/ production 
units. According to ICLS definition, informal enterprises are: 
“units engaged in the production of goods and services with the 
primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the 
persons concerned. These units typically operate at low level 
organization, with little or no division of labour and capital as 
factors of production and on small scale. Labour relations—where 
they exist—are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or 
personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements 
with formal guarantees”.4 
 
Flodman Becker (2004) claims that unfortunately the 1993 ICLS definition of informality 
fails to capture all dimensions of informality. Under this ICLS definition, individual 
countries can decide what size of unregistered units should be included in the informal 
sector and whether the agriculture sector and domestic workers should be included. 
However the definition does not specify the threshold size below which an enterprise is 
classified as informal and it leaves to each country’s discretion whether or not to include 
the agricultural sector and domestic workers. 
 
To fulfill the goal the ICLS had sought to, the International Expert Group on Informal 
Sector Statistics (Delhi Group) introduced a more precise definition of the informal sector 
in 1997 according to which the informal sector includes: 
“private unincorporated enterprises (quasi unincorporated), which 
produce at least some of their goods and services for sale or barter, 
have less than 5 paid employees, are not registered, and are 
engaged in non-agricultural activities”.5 
 
The above definition implies that informality can be defined at worker level based on 
employment relations. Informal Employment can include various categories of workers: 
                                               
4 International Labor Office and World Trade Organization (2009), Globalization and Informal Jobs in 
Developing Countries, Geneva: International Institute of Labor Studies and Washington: Economic 
Research and Statistics Division 
5 International Labour Office, 2002 
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(a) the self employed, i.e., own accounts workers, heads of family businesses and unpaid 
family workers, (b) wage workers, i.e, employees of informal enterprises, casual workers 
without a fixed employer, home workers, paid domestic workers, temporary and part time 
workers and unregistered workers and (c) employers, i.e. owners of informal enterprises. 
 
In recent years, a group of informed activists and researchers, including members of the 
global research policy network Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing (WIEGO), in conjunction with the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
have come up with a broader definition of the informal sector. They extend the focus to 
include not only enterprises that are not legally regulated but also employment 
relationships that are not legally regulated or protected. In brief, the new definition of the 
informal economy focuses on the nature of employment in addition to the characteristics 
of employment. It also includes informal employment both within and outside 
agriculture. According to this new definition, the informal sector—now called the 
informal economy—is composed of: 
 
 Informal employment in informal enterprises (small unregistered or unincorporated) 
including employers, employees, own account operators and unpaid family workers; 
 Informal employment outside informal enterprises, i.e. in formal enterprises, for 
households or with no fixed employer; this type of employment includes domestic 
workers, casual or day labourers, temporary or part time workers, industrial 
outworkers (including home workers) and unregistered or undeclared workers.6 
 
Thus, according to this definition, informal employment includes all remunerative 
work—both self employment and wage employment—that is not recognized, regulated or 
protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks and non-remunerative work 
undertaken in an income-producing enterprise.7 The next two sections relate informality 
with regulation as well as enforcement as it has been found in literature. 
 
                                               
6 International Labour Office, 2002 
7 In 2003, this definition was adopted by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) during 
its 17th Conference. 
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2.3. Regulation and Informality  
2.3.1 INFORMAL ECONOMY: WHY GOVERNMENTS SHOULD INTERVENE? 
The exact dichotomy between the formal regulatory environment and the informal 
economy is not clear even after forty years after the concept of informal economy gained 
prominence in the development discourse. The question of government intervention to 
regulate the ‘unregulated’ however demand serious attention when considered in 
conjunction to the massive illegalities carried out in the ambit of informal sector. Chen et 
al. (2001) summarizes three different schools of thought each explaining the reasons for 
government intervention from different points of view. Based on equity principle it is 
argued that the poor who are concentrated in the informal sector face uneven market 
power and discrimination; have insufficient market information or skills; and have 
inadequate insurance against risk (unemployment, illness, disability, old age). They argue 
that current process of informalization threatens to do away with years of social progress. 
They stress on strengthening the linkages between the various actors—state, business and 
organized labour. 
 
A somewhat different argument is advanced in favour of state intervention on the basis of 
efficiency principles.  In illustrating this view Chen et al. (2001) cite Weeks (1975)8 
argument: the informal sector contributes to GDP; produces a large share of consumer 
goods; represents a potential source of capital goods and provides a training ground for 
entrepreneurs. It is also observed that informal sector employs more labour intensive 
modes of production and hence it is more labour absorbing than the formal economy. 
Hence it is logical for the government to intervene and promote productivity growth in 
the informal economy minimizing the ills associated with the informal sector. 
 
The last set of opinion in favour of government regulating the informal sector is based on 
political economy principles. According to this idea, governments do intervene in 
markets and in ways that are often biased towards the big players. It is asked, why should 
                                               
8 Weeks, John. 1975. ‘Policies for Expanding Employment in the Urban Sector of Developing Economies’, 
International Labour Review. 111/1:1–13. 
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policies directed towards smaller businesses be singled out as distortionary? It is also 
argued that most policies whether or not targeted, affect the informal sector. 
 
2.3.2 EVADING REGULATIONS: RULE OF THE GAME?  
Although there may be fairly a good number of reasons that require the informal 
economy to be regulated and monitored, unfortunately however, informal economy by 
and large goes unregulated and is observed to comprise of unregistered and unregulated 
activities. Labour relations are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal 
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees. Marjit and Kar 
(2011) summarize the recent ILO view on informality as follows: 
“…different groups have been termed ‘informal’ because they share one 
important characteristic: they are not recognized or protected under legal 
and regulatory frameworks. This is not, however, the only defining feature 
of informality. Informal workers and entrepreneurs are characterized by a 
high degree of vulnerability. They are not recognized under the law and 
therefore, receive little or no legal or social protection and are unable to 
enforce contracts or have security of property rights (ILO 2002: 2).” 
 
The pertinent question that arises in this context is that what accounts for this lack of 
regulation? According to Chen (2005) it was previously held that it was simply the owner 
operators desire to evade taxes that led them to operate in the informal sector. While this 
may partially be true, ‘this is far from being the whole story’. She claims that in deciding 
whether to operate formally or informally, what becomes most important is the cost-
benefit analysis of working in the regulated sector. She points out that, often, economic 
agents operate informally not to evade taxes but may be because ‘the regulatory 
environment is too punitive, too cumbersome or simply non-existent’ and also that agents 
‘would be willing to pay registration fees and taxes if they were to receive the benefits of 
formality’. De Soto (1989), in fact, argues that the whether to be formal or informal can 
be presented as a rational decision—economic units weigh the costs and benefits that 
formalization entails and consider their institutional and resource constraints.  
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That the nature of regulation itself leads to its evasion is also documented by Schneider 
(2001): ‘The increase of the intensity of regulations is another important factor which 
reduces the freedom for individuals engaged in the official economy….Regulations lead 
to susbstantial increase in labour cost [and] these costs provide another incentive to work 
in the informal economy’. Summarizing Johnson, Kaufman and Sheifer (1997), 
Schneider argues that countries with burdensome regulation tend to have a higher share 
of the unofficial economy in total GDP. It is empirically found that a one-point increase 
of regulation index, ceteris paribus, is associated with 8.1 percentage point increase in 
share of informal economy. Loyaza (1996) finds evidence that regulations entail a 
substantial compliance costs in Latin America as well as Asia. That burdensome 
regulation may perpetuate informality is also claimed by Marjit and Kar (2011). They 
argue that it is possible that imposition of high tax burden may create more informality in 
the system. They also point out ironically efforts to formalize the informal sector through 
formal regulations often lead to ‘closure of many units, retrenchment of workers, loss of 
entrepreneurship accentuating the number of the poor and son on’. That association of the 
informal with unstructured has been a powerful impetus for government intervention 
leading to major policy failures is well documented by Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006). 
They present an important case study of Nepal where government’s effort to nationalize 
forests led to greater deforestation since the government regulatory body could not realize 
that increasing power of small local communities that were already present and had better 
structures to deal with the deforestation would have been a better measure of tackling 
deforestation rather than replacing them by formal state structures. Chen (2005) thus 
correctly summarize: ‘excessive regulation not only hurts one’s attempt to formalize but 
also his/her effort to earn a livelihood in the informal economy’. 
 
2.3.3 PROBLEMS WITH REGULATION: WAY OUT? 
Given the fact the regulation often aggravates problems associated with informality rather 
than mitigating them, two important suggestions are made: 
 
 De-regulation: Based on the classical principle that free markets maximize market 
efficiency it is often argued that complete deregulation is rather a better alternative 
than inefficient regulation, thereby reducing the role of the government to merely a 
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passive player in the formal-informal economy discourse. However, the concept of 
totally removing the presence of government from a particular sector and letting it 
operate totally on its own seems to be utopian. Chen (2005) argues against that de-
regulation of labour markets is in fact associated with the rise of informalization. It is 
claimed “workers are caught between two contradictory trends: rapid flexibilization 
of the employment relationship (making it easy for employers to contract and expand 
their workforce as needed) and slow liberalization of labour mobility.” Thus to 
protect informal workers from the ‘economic risks’ and ‘uncertainty associated with 
flexibility and informalization’ the policy of de-regulation seems to be inappropriate 
and self-destructive.   
 
 Re-regulation: In order to mitigate the ills associated with regulation one school of 
thought suggests that it is the task of the government to ensure that policies directed 
to reduce informality will on one hand reduce the cost and on the other hand increase 
the benefits of formalization. However, as existing literature points out, regulation 
targeted to benefit the actors of the informal sector will only able to serve the purpose 
if properly enforced. Thus, what in fact turns out to be crucial in the context of 
improvement of regulation quality, is not regulation itself but the aspect of 
enforcement of regulation, governance and the institutional set-up in which 
enforcement of regulation is to be carried out which according to Kanbur (2009) is a 
neglected topic in the conceptualisation of informality. 
 
2.4 Enforcement and Informality  
According to Kanbur (2009) the central determining factor behind the impact of 
regulation on economic activity is the nature and the intensity of enforcement of 
regulation. Marjit and Kar (2011) argue that contrary to general wisdom the informal 
sector is not similar to an entity that necessarily stagnate in low level equilibrium trap—
“it is however contingent…on institutional capabilities to reformulate existing 
regulation”. Thus the success or failure of formalization measures depends on the 
measures themselves as much as on the specific political, economic, social or cultural 
circumstances of their implementation. Schneider (2001) argues that a deterioration in the 
quality of public goods (such as the public infrastructure) and of the administration is 
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often coupled with the consequence of even stronger incentives to participate in the 
informal economy. He summarizes the results that Johnson et al. (1998)9 derives from a 
simple model as follows: 
“wealthier countries…find themselves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of 
relatively low tax and regulatory burden,…, good rule of law and 
corruption control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy. By contrast, 
a number of countries in Latin America and the Former Soviet Union 
exhibit characteristics consistent with ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and 
regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule of law is 
weak,…, and a relatively high share of activities in the unofficial 
economy”. 
 
These findings demonstrate that lack of proper enforcement reinforces informality 
(Dreher and Schneider, 2010) and thus government should put more emphasis on 
improving enforcement of laws and regulation, rather than increasing their numbers 
(Schneider, 2001). Kanbur (2009) argues that the government may formulate regulations 
so as to regulate the informal economy which it wants to enforce and may even have 
sufficient inspectors to enforce but if the inspectors  “turn a blind eye” and are known to 
turn a blind eye, the government’s effort to formalize the informal sector will be 
meaningless. We, however, claim that whether an official will really “turn a blind eye” 
will infact be contingent upon the state of law and the degree of unbiasedness with which 
the judicial system operates. If the rule of law is strict enough, the officials turning a 
blind eye may be easily apprehended which in turn reduces the incentive of the corrupt 
officials to engage in mal-practices. Assuming that most of the poor operate outside the 
formal sector, Marjit and Kar (2011) find “income level of a typical poor is positively 
affected by weak governance” suggesting, again, that weak governance10 (and weak 
enforcement) perpetuates the level of informality. Similar conclusions are reached by 
                                               
9 Johnson S., D. Kaufman and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1998), Corruption, Public Finances and the unofficial 
economy, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, discussion paper. 
10 Marjit and Kar (2011) claim that the quality of governance is likely to be is often determined by electoral 
motives. They argue that if the government is forced to lower tax rate (owing to strict enforcement), it is 
left with lower tax revenue for re-distribution, which in turn hurts it’s chance of winning the election. 
Therefore it lowers the governance level which indirectly favours redistribution towards poor (by 
encouraging informality). 
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Loayza et al. (2006). They develop a regression model which clearly points out that “high 
levels of regulation are associated with lower growth…However, the quality of 
regulation—as captured by the overall institutional framework—makes a big difference”. 
Thus regulation with out enforcement becomes a ‘mockery, if not a self inflicted fraud’ is 
expressed in the report of the Second National Labour Commission (Government of 
India, 2002, paragraph 12.250) and is summarized by Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2002): 
“We, therefore feel that we should legislate only what is capable of being put into 
practice at the ground level…Any other course will breed disrespect, unconcern and 
contempt for the law and law enforcing authorities”. Drawing on this enforcement aspect, 
Kanbur (2009) claims that apart from the state of legal system and judiciary acting as 
determinants to enforcement to the regulations legislated, the government also must 
signal the market that it is really serious about enforcement. For instance, by setting a 
higher minimum wage it can signal credibly its intention to enforce more and that is why 
ground level legal activists like the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) lobby 
for higher official wages even in the face of non-enforcement, since, with a bigger gap 
between official and actual wages, they can lobby for more enforcement effort, with a 
resulting higher actual wage (Basu, Chau and Kanbur, forthcoming). 
 
The relation between regulation and informal employment is not very clear. Whereas, 
overall regulation perpetuates informality and hence acts as a disincentive against 
formalization (Chen, 2005; Loyaza 1996; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006) may seem to be 
an acceptable proposition, the effect of improvement in the quality of regulation (thereby 
introducing more flexibility in the system) on the level of informal employment, is not 
well documented in the existing literature. That is, imposing rigidity in regulation may be 
bad alright, but does that in way suggest that introducing flexibility in the system is the 
sufficient condition to arrest the level of informality? Unfortunately, this issue, although 
extremely vital from policy point of view, remains largely under-exposed in the literature 
of informality. 
 
3. Research Objective  
In the present study we argue that improving regulation quality with the motive of 
bringing down the level of informal employment may be a necessary condition (Kanbur, 
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2009) but is far from being a sufficient one. We claim that the effect of (improved or 
flexible) regulation is contingent primarily upon the quality of governance and the 
capability of the institutions to put the (improved or flexible) regulations into effect.  
 
More specifically, we hypothesize that regulation will have no significant effect on 
informality, and hence fail to serve as an efficient policy instrument, when it goes un-
enforced. The desired effect of regulation will only be achieved in an environment of 
good governance and unbiased legal system. What, thus, becomes important, in the 
context of curbing informal employment, is not the quality of regulation that theory 
suggests, but the interaction between regulation and the governance. 
 
In addition, we also seek to explore the exact relationship between informal employment 
and different forms of regulation—credit market regulation, labour market regulation and 
business regulation—separately with the dual objective of finding whether every category 
of regulation affects informality in the same way or not. We are also interested to check 
which form of regulation, when enforced, has a relatively greater influence on informal 
employment. 
 
4. Data and Research Methodology  
4.1 Data 
In the present analysis of the relation among informal employment, regulation and 
enforcement, the data for 46 countries over the period 1980 to 2008 has been considered. 
However, since reliable statistics on informal employment and regulation indices are not 
readily available for all the countries included in our analysis for every year (and this 
problem becomes more serious for the LDCs), number of observation corresponding to 
each country seem to differ substantially. The number of observations per country varies 
between 2 to 1311.  
 
4.1.1 INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT  
                                               
11 Countries with small number of observations have been used in our analysis for their extreme relevance 
in the study of informality. For instance, although there are only 2 observations corresponding to Mali, it is 
retained because informal employment in Mali is more than 95 percent of its total employment! 
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The study is based on the informal employment data readily available from World Bank 
(Key Indicators of Labor Market [KILM])12 and International Institute of Labor Studies 
(IILS)13. However, since deficiency of reliable informal employment statistics is 
pronounced for a large number of countries and for large time periods, for incorporating 
those countries in the analysis, proximate informality figures have been used. For 
instances, for some countries Informal Employment (as a percentage of total 
employment) is taken as the difference between total Employment (in percentage) and 
total wage Employment (in percentage), to arrive at a proximate figure where total 
Employment figures obtained from ILO and wage employment figures obtained from 
KILM. And in other cases the vulnerable employment (as a percentage of total 
employment) figures available from World Bank Data Bank have been used as proximate 
estimates of informality. 
 
4.1.2 REGULATION 
Data on regulation has been primarily drawn from Economic Freedom of the World 
Database (The Fraser Institute). In this study, scores have been assigned to 141 countries 
over the period 1970-2008 based on the quality and extent of regulation. The overall 
regulation is broken down into three categories, namely, credit market regulation, labour 
market regulation and business regulation. Each category comprises of further sub-
components capturing different aspects of the credit market, labour market and business 
operations. Scoring has been done using the following methodology. First, the various 
sub-components under the three broad categories have been ranked separately. Second, 
the average of these ranks or scores is computed for each of the three categories for each 
country over time and these form the categorical-scores. And lastly, overall regulation 
score is computed as the simple average of the scores of these three broad categories. For 
                                               
12 The KILM indicator is a measure of employment in the informal sector as a percentage of total 
employment, i.e. the ratio between the number of persons in informal sector employment and the total 
number of employed persons. There are wide variations in definitions and methodology of data collection 
related to the informal sector and there are as many as five series of employment in the informal sector data 
based on five different definitions. While one country might have had available information on informal 
sector employment according to multiple series, only one series is shown in the KILM database; this is the 
series deemed to be best in terms of definition applied, geographic coverage and/or length of the time 
series. 
13 IILS gives four different measures of informal employment. We have used the series which is based on 
national definition of informal employment. 
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our analysis, we have not considered the sub-component scores explicitly. Rather we 
have considered overall regulation scores and scores of the three broad categories of 
regulation. 
 
(A) Credit Market Regulation 
This category reflects the domestic credit market conditions. Scoring takes into account 
the extent to which the banking industry is dominated by private firms, whether foreign 
banks are permitted to compete in the market, the extent to which credit is supplied to the 
private sector and whether controls on interest rates interfere with the market in credit. 
Countries that use a private banking system to allocate credit to private parties and refrain 
from controlling interest rates receive higher ratings for this regulatory component. 
Following are the sub-components used to construct this index: 
 
 Ownership of Banks: Data on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned 
banks were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately 
held deposits received higher ratings. When privately held deposits totaled between 
95% and 100%, countries were given a rating of 10. A zero rating was assigned when 
private deposits were 10% or less of the total. 
 Foreign Bank Competition: If a country approved all or most foreign bank 
applications and if foreign banks had a large share of the banking sector assets, then 
the country received a higher rating 
 Private Sector Credit: This sub-component measures the extent to which government 
borrowing crowds out private borrowing. When data are available, this sub-
component is calculated as the government fiscal deficit as a share of gross savings. 
Since the deficit is expressed as a negative value, higher numerical values result in 
higher ratings. The formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component 
was (−Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax + Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the deficit to gross 
investment ratio, and the values for Vmax and Vmin are set at 0 and −100%, 
respectively. The formula allocates higher ratings as the deficit gets smaller (i.e., 
closer to zero) relative to gross saving. If the deficit data are not available, the 
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component is instead based on the share of private credit to total credit extended in 
the banking sector. Higher values are indicative of greater economic freedom. 
 Interest rate controls/ negative real interest rates: Data on credit-market controls and 
regulations were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with interest rates 
determined by the market, stable monetary policy, and positive real deposit and 
lending rates received higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily 
by market forces and the real rates were positive, countries were given a rating of 10. 
A zero rating was assigned when the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the 
government and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or 
hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market. 
 
(B) Labour Market Regulation 
Many types of labor-market regulations infringe on the economic freedom of employees 
and employers. Among the more prominent are minimum wages, dismissal regulations, 
centralized wage setting, extension of union contracts to nonparticipating parties, and 
conscription. The labor-market regulation category is designed to measure the extent to 
which these restraints are operative. A country which allows market forces to determine 
wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of 
conscription have been given higher scores. The components upon which this category is 
based are as follows: 
 
 Hiring Regulation and Minimum Wage: Zero-to-one score assigned based on 
difficulty of hiring. Countries with hiring difficulties are given lower ratings 
 Hiring and Firing Regulations: 1-to-7 score is assigned for this subsection; score of 1 
is assigned if hiring and firing of workers is impeded by regulation and score of 7 is 
assigned if there is flexibility in hiring and firing. 
 Centralized Collective Bargaining: 1-to-7 score is assigned based on the question: 
“Wages in your country are set by centralized bargaining process (=1) or up to each 
individual company (=7).”  
 Hours Regulation: This sub-component is based on the World Bank’s Doing 
Business, Rigidity of Hours Index. The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) 
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whether there are restrictions on night work; (ii) whether there are restrictions on 
weekly holiday work; (iii) whether the work-week can consist of 5.5 days; (iv) 
whether the work-week can extend to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2 
months a year to respond to a seasonal increase in production; and (v) whether paid 
annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer. For questions (i) and (ii), when 
restrictions other than premiums apply, a score of 1 is given. If the only restriction is 
a premium for night work and weekly holiday work, a score of 0, 0.33, 0.66, or 1 is 
given according to the quartile in which the economy’s premium falls. If there are no 
restrictions, the economy receives a score of zero. For questions (iii), (iv) and (v), 
when the answer is no, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is assigned.” 
 Mandated Cost of Worker Dismissal:  Rating of zero given if dismissal cost (cost of 
the requirements for advance notice, severance payments, and penalties when 
dismissing a redundant worker) is high in a country. Formula used to calculate zero-
to-10 rating is as follows: (Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin) where Vmax and Vmin were set 
at 108 weeks and zero weeks respectively. 
 Conscription: Data on the use and duration of military conscription were used to 
construct rating intervals. Countries with longer conscription period received lower 
ratings. 
 
(C) Business Regulation 
This regulation-category is made up of components designed to identify the extent to 
which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. 
High scores have been allotted to countries which allow markets to determine prices and 
refrain from regulatory activities that retard entry into business and increase the cost of 
producing products. The components of Business Regulation are as follows: 
 
 Price Controls: The more widespread the price controls, the lower the rating. 
Countries were given a rating of 10 if no price controls were present and a rating of 
zero when there was widespread use of price controls. 
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 Administrative Requirements: A score of zero was assigned if administrative 
requirements (permits, regulation) were burdensome and a score of 7 was assigned if 
requirements were not burdensome. 
 Bureaucracy Costs: Standards on product/service quality, energy and other 
regulations in the country are given score of 1 if non-existent and a score of 7 if 
among the world’s most stringent. 
 Starting a Business: Zero-to-10 ratings were given; countries where it takes longer or 
is more costly to start a business are given lower ratings. 
 Extra payments / Bribes: This sub-component is based on the question: “In your 
industry, how commonly would you estimate the firms make undocumented 
payments or bribes connected with: Import and export permits, public utilities, getting 
favourable judicial decisions. Common (=1) Never Occur (=7).” 
 Licensing Restrictions: Zero-to-10 ratings were constructed for (1) the time cost and 
(2) the monetary cost of obtaining the license. Lesser the restrictions, higher the 
scores. 
 Cost of Tax Compliance: Zero-to-10 ratings were assigned based on time required per 
year for a business to prepare file, and pay taxes on corporate income. Lesser the time 
required higher the ranking. 
 
(D) Overall Regulation 
Scores on overall regulation is the simple average of credit market regulation, labour 
market regulation and business regulation. Zero-to-10 rating scale; higher ratings 
indicative of greater flexibility in the system or greater economic freedom, lower ratings 
imply presence of rigidity in the system.  
   
4.1.3 ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS 
Governance’s ability to enforce regulations is captured in our analysis as an interaction 
between the quality of legal system and the level of regulation. Data on quality of legal 
system has been derived from the Economic Freedom of the World Database (The Fraser 
Institute). The data corresponding to the quality of legal system are in form of scoring/ 
ranks: higher scores assigned to countries with independent judiciary, impartial courts, 
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protected property rights, easy enforcibility of contracts etc. Data on legal system for the 
countries included in our analysis for different years are multiplied by corresponding 
regulation-indices to arrive at the final value of government’s ability to enforce 
regulations. Naturally, higher values indicate greater ability of government to enforce 
regulations. 
 
4.2 Research Methodology 
The primary motive of this dissertation is to explore the linkages between informality, 
regulation and enforcement. Hence we concentrate primarily on three variables, namely, 
informal employment (as a percentage of total employment), regulation (overall as well 
as sub-categories) and enforcement of regulations (as captured by the interaction between 
quality of legal system and regulation). We begin our exploration on the basis of 
descriptive statistics of variables of our interest and checking the relation among them 
using scatter plots and correlation matrix. Then we move on to the regression section in 
order to derive concrete and robust results. 
 
5. Summary Statistics 
5.1 Informality across the Countries 
The importance of the informal economy primarily stems out of the fact that this sector 
employs more than 60 percent of the labour-force in less developed countries. Not only is 
informality a reality in the third world nations, it also is the means of livelihood of around 
20 to 30 percent of the working population in the developed nations. Our sample reveals 
a somewhat similar picture. Table 1 shows the informal employment figures for the 
developed and the less developed countries for the decade of 1990 followed by the 
decade of 2000. Three observations are worth noting. One, for both the decades informal 
employment in less developed countries is almost double than that of developed 
countries, and two, informal employment exhibits a persistent nature, that is, for both—
the less developed and the developed—informal employment has remained almost stable 
over both the decades and lastly, developed countries registers a 3% drop in the level of 
informal employment.  
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Table 1: Mean Informal Employment in Developed and Less Developed Countries 
(as Percentage of Total Employment) 
Years  
Countries 1990 2000 
Developed  31.80 28.74 
Less Developed  62.48 61.13 
                     Source: KILM, IILS and own estimation. 
 
Figure 1 shows informal employment for five regions, namely, Europe, Asia, Central 
America, Africa, Latin America and Oceania. Further, we categorize Africa into two 
groups: Africa including South Africa and Africa and excluding South Africa. For both, 
1990s and 2000s, Africa (excluding South Africa) exhibits highest average informal 
employment among all the geographical regions. However, highest variation in informal 
employment is observed for Asia perhaps due to the fact that the nations from Asia 
included in our sample come from both the ends of spectrum of informal employment, 
that is, our sample includes developed Asian countries like Japan (which exhibits low 
levels of employment in the informal sector) as well as developing Asian countries like 
India and Bangladesh (having extremely high informal employment). Variation in case of 
African nations are not however significant since the spread of informal employment is 
almost same for all the African nations (excluding South Africa). The two Americas 
(Central and Latin America) exhibit moderate levels of informality coupled with fairly 
low variation for both the decades.  Low mean and variation is persistently displayed by 
Oceania followed by Europe. It is no surprise however since these regions house most of 
the developed nations of the world. 
 
Figure 1: Informal Employment for Six Continents during 1990s and 2000s 
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Note: (*) indicates that in estimating mean and standard deviation for Africa we have not considered South 
Africa. 
Source: KILM, IILS and own estimation. 
 
Figure 2: Mean Informal Employment for Selected Countries for 2000 
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5.2 Relating Informality with Regulation and Enforcement 
Although there may be a plethora of theories conceptualizing the structure of the informal 
economy and its possible linkages with the formal economy and formal regulatory 
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bodies, one aspect that almost all the economists agree to is that regulation more often 
aggravates the problems of informality than solving it. Thus, it is often prescribed that the 
correct path of tackling informality is to introduce flexibility in the system and improve 
the quality of regulation so that it provides every incentive for informal agents to start 
operating in the ambit of formal economy.  
 
The scatter diagram plotted in Figure 3 examines the relation between overall regulation 
and informal employment. It is found that there exists a negative relation between the two 
variables. Since higher ratings for regulations indicates greater flexibility in the system 
and lower ratings imply presence of rigidity in the system, the inverse relation indicates 
that the more the flexibility is introduced in the system, lesser will be the volume of 
informal employment. However, when the same exercise is carried out for the sub-
categories of overall regulation, viz., credit market regulation, labour market regulation 
and business regulation as plotted in Figures 4 it is observed that while stringency in 
credit market regulation adversely affect informal employment, the relation between 
labour market and business regulation and informal employment are not very robust.  
 
Figure 3: Relation between Informal Employment and Overall Index of Regulation 
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Figure 4: Relation between Informal Employment and Different Indices of Regulation 
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Sharper positions are obtained using the data for selected countries for the year 2000 as 
plotted in Figures 5 to 8. 
 
 
Figure 5: Informal Employment and Overall Index of Regulation for 2000 
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Figure 4: Informal Employment and Index of Credit Market Regulation for 2000 
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Figure 5: Informal Employment and Index of Labour Market Regulation for 2000 
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Figure 6: Informal Employment and Index of Business Regulation for 2000 
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Next, we move to explore the role of enforcement in our analysis. The scatter plots in 
Figures 7 and 8 reveal that the results are similar to those obtained above. However, the 
overall fit of the scatter plots for all the cases seem to improve considerably indicating 
that quality of governance and legal system might have some role in checking 
informality14. 
 
Figure 7: Informal Employment and Enforcement of Regulation 
 
                                               
14 The correlation matrix between informal employment and regulation reflect the same picture. While the 
correlation between overall regulation and informal employment is -0.57, the interaction between overall 
regulation and legal system yields a higher correlation of -0.76. Similar results hold for the sub-categories 
(See Table 1 in Appendix). 
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Figure 8: Informal Employment and Enforcement of different categories of Regulation 
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The above analysis shows that enforcement might have some role to play in the analyses 
of the impact of regulation on informality. This finding, in fact, gives rise to a host of 
inter-related questions: What is the degree of importance with which one should treat 
enforcement with? Is institutional quality, government’s ability to enforce regulation 
extremely crucial? Is introduction of flexibility into the regulatory system (so as to check 
informality) contingent upon the quality of governance? To sort out these issues so as to 
come up with concrete findings, further exploration of the linkages between regulation, 
enforcement and informal employment is needed. 
 
6. Regression Analysis 
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The purpose of this paper is primarily to explore the linkages between regulation under 
two circumstances: without enforcement and with enforcement. Our hypothesis, thus, can 
be assumed to consist of two related parts: one, regulation without enforcement is 
useless, and two, effect of regulation is contingent upon the state of governance and legal 
system. Subsequently, testing our hypothesis, calls for framing two models (the second 
being a mere extension of the first); the first one excluding the interaction of regulation 
and governance and the second one, including the same so as to capture the dynamics of  
interaction ignored by the first. 
 
6.1 Introducing the Control Variables 
Our study pre-dominantly explores the relationship among informal employment, 
regulation and enforcement of regulation. Put differently, we intend to capture the effect 
of regulation and enforcement of the level of informal employment using a sample of 46 
countries for various years in the time period 1980-2008. However, regulation and 
enforcement are correlated with several other variables which need to be explicitly 
incorporated in our model as control variables so as to control their effects when 
estimating the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In this 
study, we use three such control variables (two of which are, in fact, composite indices, 
thus, including the effect of several variables that affect regulation and enforcement), 
namely, log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $), index of size of government and 
access to sound money15. The index of size of government measure the degree to which a 
country relies on personal choice rather than government budgets and political decision 
making, that is, it measures the extent to which countries rely on political process to 
allocate resources and goods and services. Countries with low levels of government 
spending as a share of the total, a smaller government enterprise sector, and lower 
marginal tax rates earn the highest ratings in this area. The reason for inclusion of this 
variable as a control variable is that the presence of government must influence the share 
                                               
15 Indices of size of government and access to sound money are composite indices. Index of size of 
government is represents four aspects of governance, namely, government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption, transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, government enterprises 
and investment and top marginal tax rate. Index of access to sound money, again, comprise of four sub-
categories, namely, money growth, standard deviation of inflation, inflation in most recent year and 
freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. Both these indices have been derived from Economic 
Freedom of the World Database (The Fraser Institute). 
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of formal employment – by either providing direct employment opportunities to the 
workers or creating an environment to the formal transaction. The index of access to 
sound money incorporates two issues: one, the consistency of monetary policy (or 
institutions) with long term price stability and two, the ease with which other currencies 
can be used via domestic and foreign bank accounts. High rating have been given to those 
countries which follow policies and adopt institutions that lead to low (and stable) rates 
of inflation and avoid regulations that limit the ability to use alternative currencies. The 
index of access to sound money is used in our analysis so as to control. Since informal 
employment gives much flexibility, the producer would like to prefer those in presence of 
high volatile financial and unstable money market in order to avoid risk. In order words, 
unstable money market does not encourage business activities to be thrived and thereby 
let the workers to find livelihood in the informal sector. 
 
6.2 Framing the Model 
We begin by assuming away the role of enforcement in the context of regulation and 
enforcement. The hypothesized form of the informal employment function therefore 
takes the following form: 
INF = Ω (REG, L_GDPPC1, SOG, SM)                                                                          [1] 
where, INF: Informal employment (as a percentage of total employment) 
REG: Index of overall regulation 
L_GDPPC1: Log of GDP Per Capita (at constant 2000 US $) in previous period 
SOG: Index of size of government 
SM: Index of sound money 
 
Next, we try to capture the dynamics of enforcement and regulation by introducing an 
interaction term—interaction between level of governance and regulation—and see how 
the working of [1] gets modified and what additional implications (if any) does the 
interaction have for our study. Therefore the re-formulated informal employment 
function becomes: 
INF = τ (REG, LPREG, L_GDPPC1, SOG, SM)                                                             [2] 
where LPREG: Interaction between Index of Legal System and Index of Regulation. 
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In the present study we incorporate lagged values of log GDP Per Capita instead of 
current values. The reason is that the GDP and other variable might explain the 
informality but they may be correlated. In order to avoid this, we consider lag value of 
GDP. 
 
This dissertation uses data on 46 countries which has been pooled from various sources. 
The data relates to the period 1980-2008. Econometric theory suggests that in such cases 
either of the two forms of regression may be applicable: 
 
(i) Pooled Cross Section Regression: An independently pooled cross section assumes that 
data set has been obtained by sampling randomly from a large population at different 
points in time. Such models are of the form 
Yit = βXit + εit                                                                                                                     [3] 
where Yit: value of dependent variable for cross section unit I at time t 
i = 1, 2, … , n and t = 1, 2, …, T 
Xit: value of the explanatory variable for unit i at time t 
εit ~ i.i.d. ( 0, σ
2 ) 
Pooled Cross Section models are, thus, time and space invariant, and in such models 
individual observations are uncorrelated and errors are homoscedastic across individual 
units and time. Under such circumstances the ordinary least squares provide consistent 
and estimator of α and β. 
 
(ii) Panel Data Regression: A panel data set, while having both a cross-sectional and a 
time series dimension, differs in some important respects from an independently pooled 
cross section. To collect panel data—sometimes called longitudinal data—we follow (or 
attempt to follow) the same individuals, families, firms, cities, states, or whatever, across 
time. Moreover, in case of panel data models the unobserved effects affecting the 
dependent variable are assumed to be consisting of two types: those that are constant16 
and those that vary over time. In other words, the error term consists of two distinct parts, 
                                               
16 According to Wooldridge(), for the econometric analysis of panel data, we cannot assume that the 
observations are independently distributed across time. For example, factors (such as ability) that affect 
someone’s wage in 1990 will also affect that person’s wage in 1991; unobserved factors that affect a city’s 
crime rate in 1985 will also affect that city’s crime rate in 1990. 
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a time-invariant individual specific effect and an unsystematic (random) part varying 
across individuals and time. Thus the basic framework of the panel data regression model 
is of the form 
 Yit = βXit + µi + ηit                                                                                                           [4] 
where µi: unobservable individual specific effect 
ηit: remainder disturbance which varies across time and individual (classical) 
 
According to Greene (2003), the fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a pure 
cross section or time series is partly because panel data enables researchers to examine 
issues that could not be studied in either cross-sectional or time-series settings alone17. 
Other advantages of panel data are as follows: one, panel data enables controlling for 
individual heterogeneity, and two, panel data sets are more informative—it exhibits more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency. 
 
In the context of panel data, two models are used most widely for purposes of 
econometric analysis. These are: 
 Random Effect Model: In this case the time invariant component of error µi is 
assumed to be independent of Xit. The variance-covariance matrix in context of 
random effect model is a non-spherical one. Hence OLS fails and we have to consider 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method to estimate the unknown parameters of 
the model. 
 Fixed Effect Model: In case of fixed effect model, the presumption is that the 
unobserved time invariant µi is correlated with Xit. A common formulation assumes 
that differences across units can be captured in the constant term. The FE model can, 
thus, be represented as 
Yit = iµi +  βXit + ηit                                                                                                    [5] 
where iµi are intercept terms/ unknown parameters that vary across individual units 
                                               
17 Greene (2003) summarizes the Ben-Porath (1973) study of labour supply to illustrate the advantages of 
panel data. In the study, it was observed that at a certain point, in a cohort of women, 50 percent may 
appear to be working. It is ambiguous whether this finding implies that one-half of the women on average 
will be working or that same one-half will be working in every period. These have different implications 
for policy. Cross-sectional data alone will not shed any light on the question. Only panel data can 
discriminate between the cases described above. 
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(states or countries), but remain invariant across time. Since the error term, in this 
case, satisfy classical properties, the OLS method can used to estimate [5]. 
 
The standard test to distinguish between a pooled cross-sectional data and a panel data is 
the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) Test devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980). If the LM test 
confirms that the dataset we are using is indeed a panel data, we need to check whether 
the model to be employed is a Fixed Effect Model (FEM) or Random Effect Model 
(REM). We use the specification test devised by Hausman (1978) as the model selection 
test18.  
 
6.3 Results and Discussion 
6.3.1 Basic Model 
The result of model [1] is given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Unbalanced Panel Regression 
 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
 
Methodology: Generalized Least Squares 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test = 551.17 (1 df, prob. value = 0.00) 
 
(High values of LM favour FEM/ REM over CR model). 
 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 7.63 (4 df, prob. value = 0.10) 
 
(High [low] values of H favour FEM [REM]). 
 
RE model is inconsistent, which leads us to use a fixed effects model. The results of the 
FE model are: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
 
Dependent Variable = INF 
 
Model Size: Obsv. = 254, Parameters = 44, Deg. Fr. = 210 
                                               
18 The Hausman (1978) test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, both OLS in 
the FEM and GLS are consistent, but OLS is inefficient, whereas under the alternative, OLS is consistent 
and efficient, but GLS is not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically, and a test can be based on the difference (Greene, 2003).   
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Fit: R-squared (within) = 0.25, R-squared (between) = 0.81, R-squared (overall) = 0.78 
 
Model test: F [4, 210] = 17.12, Prob. value = 0.00 
 
Results from Panel (Fixed-effects) Regression 
 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. Standard Error t-ratio P-value 
L_GDPPC1 -29.59 3.78 -7.83 0.00 
SOG 0.18 0.22 0.81 0.42 
SM 0.31 0.23 1.34 0.18 
REG 0.11 0.26 0.41 0.68 
CONST. 142.90 13.72 10.41 0.00 
 
The panel regression tests for whether the fixed effects (FE) or the random effects (RE) 
model is consistent with the data, given that FE/RE is the natural choice over the classical 
regression model suitable for pooled cross section data since the value of Lagrange 
multiplier is very large and associated p-value is zero. Further between FE and RE the 
results of the Hausman test clearly suggest that the FE is the appropriate model in our 
case. Consequently, the fixed effects method (or within transformation) is used for 
estimating the model. The fixed effects model show a overall significance indicated by 
zero p value corresponding to the F-statistic for the test of joint significance of all the 
coefficients. In the estimated model, it can be observed that coefficient of REG is positive 
but is not statistically significant. The coefficients of control variables SOG and SM also 
seem to be insignificant. However, coefficient of L_GDPPC1 is statistically significant 
and negative. Analysis of the correlation matrix for the control variables shows that 
L_GDPPC1 is highly correlated with SOG and SM. This would imply the presence of 
multicollinearity and explain the relatively low t-values observed for SOG and SM. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Control Variables 
 L_GDPPC1 SOG SM 
L_GDPPC1 1.00   
SOG -0.46 1.00  
SM 0.56 -0.17 1.00 
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Analysis of the results of model [1] reveals an interesting picture. Economic growth (as 
captured by an increase in L_GDPPC1) significantly helps curbing informal employment 
as shown but the negative significant relation between INF and L_GDPPC1. But the 
instrument of containing informal employment is definitely not regulation. As our results 
point out, coefficient of regulation is insignificant implying that regulation by itself 
cannot influence level of informality in an economy. So, the claim that introducing 
flexibility in the regulation system brings down informality, does not seem to hold. 
 
The result of model [1A] is given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Unbalanced Panel Regression 
 
Random Effects Model: v(i, t) = e(i, t) + u(i) 
 
Methodology: Generalized Least Squares 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test = 539.36 (1 df, prob. value = 0.00) 
 
(High values of LM favour FEM/ REM over CR model). 
 
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 23.60 (5 df, prob. value = 0.0003) 
 
(High [low] values of H favour FEM [REM]). 
 
RE model is inconsistent, which leads us to use a fixed effects model. The results of the 
FE model are: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
 
Dependent Variable = INF 
 
Model Size: Obsv. = 254, Parameters = 45, Deg. Fr. = 209 
 
Fit: R-squared (within) = 0.26, R-squared (between) = 0.81, R-squared (overall) = 0.79 
 
Model test: F [5, 209] = 15.04, Prob. value = 0.00 
 
Results from Panel (Fixed-effects) Regression 
 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. Standard Error t-ratio P-value 
L_GDPPC1 -27.65 3.83 -7.21 0.00 
SOG 0.11 0.22 0.51 0.61 
SM 0.29 0.23 1.29 0.20 
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REG 0.78 0.39 1.98 0.05 
LPREG -0.08 0.04 -2.30 0.02 
CONST. 134.96 14.01 9.63 0.00 
 
Table [4] presents the results of the regression when we include the interaction between 
regulation and quality of legal system (as a proxy to level of governance) as an additional 
explanatory variable. As before, we use the Hausman test as the model selection criteria 
and subsequently proceed with the Fixed Effects Model as dictated by the test. We use 
the Fixed Effects transformation to estimate the model which shows overall significance. 
The coefficient on overall regulation index now remains positive as before but turns out 
to be statistically significant. Its corresponding interaction term with legal system/ 
governance carries a statistically significant negative coefficient. This result can be 
interpreted as follows: For low levels of governance and poor quality of legal system 
(biased judiciary etc), making overall regulation more flexible leads to an expansion of 
informal employment. However, as rule of law improves and quality of governance 
becomes better, introducing greater flexibility in the legal system helps curbing informal 
employment. Thus, what we might infer is that for low levels of governance and poor 
enforcement, introducing freedom in the regulatory system will increase informal 
employment and thus re-regulation, in this case, will create more problem than solve. 
However, with improvement in enforcement capability of the government, flexibility in 
regulation will provide with the required incentives to the informal workers to join the 
formal workforce thereby causing the level of informal employment to diminish.  
 
6.3.2 Extension 
The previous section clearly establishes the fact that the effect of regulation ultimately is 
contingent upon the level of institutional development. However, in this analysis so far 
we have not used any specific categories of regulation as such. However, when the 
question of regulatory instruments in hands of the government is considered we need 
identify what categories of regulation affect informal employment and which direction. 
This inturn demands analysis of the relation between different categories of regulation 
and the level of informal employment. We perform the panel data regression for the same 
dataset controlling for the same variables as before. However, in place of overall 
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regulation and its interaction with the quality of legal system, we use three categories of 
regulation and their corresponding interaction terms. The model that we use, thus, is of 
the following form: 
INF = η (CMR, LMR, BR, LPCMR, LPLMR, LPBR, L_GDPPC1, SOG, SM) 
where, CMR: Index of Credit Market Regulation 
LMR: Index of Labour Market Regulation 
BR: Index of Business Regulation 
LPCMR: Interaction between Index of Legal System and Index of Credit Market 
Regulation 
LPLMR: Interaction between Index of Legal System and Index of Labour Market 
Regulation 
LPBR: Interaction between Index of Legal System and Index of Business 
Regulation  
All other variables have similar meaning as before. 
 
Having framed the model, we run a Fixed Effects regression whose results are reported in 
table [5]. 
 
Table 5: Unbalanced Panel Regression 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
 
Dependent Variable = INF 
 
Model Size: Obsv. = 251, Parameters = 49, Deg. Fr. = 202 
 
Fit: R-squared (within) = 0.32, R-squared (between) = 0.81, R-squared (overall) = 0.79 
 
Model test: F [9, 202] = 10.32, Prob. value = 0.00 
 
Results from Panel (Fixed-effects) Regression 
 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. Standard Error t-ratio P-value 
L_GDPPC1 -29.61 4.04 -7.33 0.00 
SOG 0.16 0.22 0.78 0.44 
SM 0.42 0.23 1.81 0.07 
CMR 0.69 0.51 1.35 0.18 
LMR -1.43 0.62 -2.31 0.02 
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BR 1.50 0.56 2.66 0.01 
LPCMR -0.06 0.08 -0.70 0.49 
LPLMR 0.16 0.09 1.86 0.07 
LPBR -0.19 0.09 -2.22 0.03 
CONST. 140.93 14.70 9.59 0.00 
 
The panel data regression results indicate that while the labour market regulation and 
credit market regulation and the respective interaction terms significantly affect informal 
employment, the credit market regulation and its interaction term fails to exhibit any 
significant relation with informal employment. Thus, from policy point of view, while the 
former two categories may be thought of as instruments to contain informal employment, 
the latter exhibits no such role. In addition, the sign of the coefficients of the labour 
market regulation and business regulation and their respective interaction terms seems to 
be interesting. The coefficient of labour market regulation is positive while that of its 
interaction term is negative. This implies that for low levels of enforcement, flexibility in 
labour regulation will tend to boost the level of informal employment, and as 
enforcement quality improves, flexible labour regulation might help curbing informal 
employment. As for business regulation, we observe the opposite scenario. The 
coefficient of business regulation is negative while its interaction term has a positive 
coefficient. This essentially means, holding all other variables constant, introducing 
flexibility in business regulation is expected to arrest the level of informal employment. 
However, when quality of enforcement improves, flexible business regulation affects 
informal employment in positive way, that is, with good governance, flexible business 
regulation attracts more workers in the informal sector. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The study shows that regulation by itself has no role in reducing or aggravating the leveli 
of informality in an economy. Regulation will only affect levels of informality when it is 
enforced. Thus a country might have flexible labour, business and credit market 
regulations with the aim of arresting the size of the informal sector (assuming the rigidity 
in regulation serves as a disincentive to formalize) but may totally fail to do so if the 
enforcement authority is incapable in enforcing the laws. For instance, regulations aimed 
at abandoning the licensing system (in which corruption is inherent) will provide 
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incentive to entrepreneurs to start business in the ambit of the formal sector only when 
they are assured that licensing system does not get replaced by corruption and bribery 
owing to biased legal system and judiciary.  
 
In other words, we argue that regulations aimed at adding flexibility into the system (and 
thereby containing informality) will only be meaningful if enforced properly. In addition, 
we also claim that all types of regulation (when enforced) may not affect informal 
employment in the same way. In fact some types of regulation may even turn out to be 
insignificant to reduce informality. Thus a deeper analysis of the linkages between 
alternative regulation mechanisms and informal employment is sought. 
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Appendix: Countries included in the analysis 
 
1. Argentina 
2. Australia 
3. Bangladesh 
4. Belgium 
5. Bolivia 
6. Brazil 
7. Chile 
8. China 
9. Colombia 
10. Costa Rica 
11. Croatia 
12. Ecuador 
13. Finland 
14. Georgia 
15. Greece 
16. Honduras 
17. India 
18. Indonesia 
19. Italy 
20. Japan 
21. Kenya 
22. Luxembourg 
23. Malaysia 
24. Mali 
25. Malta 
26. Mexico 
27. Netherlands 
28. New Zealand 
29. Nicaragua 
30, Norway 
31. Pakistan 
32. Panama 
33. Paraguay 
34. Peru 
35. Poland 
36. Portugal 
37. South Africa 
38. Spain 
39. Switzerland 
40. Thailand 
41. United Kingdom 
42. Uruguay 
43. Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  
44. Vietnam 
45. Zambia 
46. Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A: Correlation Matrix 
 INF REG CMR LMR BR LPREG LPCMR LPPMR LPBR 
INF 1         
REG -0.57 1        
CMR -0.56 0.78 1       
LMR -0.21 0.75 0.33 1      
BR -0.57 0.78 0.49 0.37 1     
LPREG -0.76 0.84 0.61 0.53 0.83 1    
LPCMR -0.80 0.81 0.71 0.42 0.78 0.98 1   
LPLMR -0.63 0.85 0.49 0.78 0.69 0.92 0.84 1  
LPBR -0.73 0.76 0.52 0.38 0.91 0.97 0.94 0.82 1 
Source: Economic Freedom of the World Report and Author’s estimation 
Note: Description of Variables: INF = Informal Employment (as a percentage of total employment); REG 
= Index of Overall Regulation; CMR = Credit Market Regulation; LMR = Labour Market Regulation; BR 
= Business Regulation; LPREG = Interaction between quality of legal system and overall regulation; 
LPCMR = Interaction between quality of legal system and Credit Market Regulation; LPLMR = Interaction 
between quality of legal system and labour market regulation; LPBR = Interaction between quality of legal 
system and Business Regulation. 
 
 
Table 2A: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 
Variables Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Observations 
INF 36.34 21.06 0.49 2.51 6.52 96.70 423 
CMR 7.80 1.69 -1.45 6.06 0.00 10.00 423 
LMR 5.65 1.43 0.11 2.27 2.30 8.60 372 
BR 5.82 1.19 0.12 2.96 2.70 9.40 329 
REG 6.43 1.25 -0.78 4.69 1.20 9.40 423 
LP 6.30 2.10 -0.18 2.10 1.40 10.00 422 
LPCMR 50.46 22.58 0.15 2.03 0.00 100.00 422 
LPLMR 36.89 17.00 0.45 2.53 3.68 78.2 372 
LPBR 37.62 18.49 0.43 2.33 4.62 86.48 329 
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LPREG 41.90 18.81 0.22 2.12 2.70 88.00 422 
SOG 6.06 1.40 -0.25 2.49 2.00 9.30 423 
SM 8.01 1.92 -1.62 6.01 0.00 9.80 423 
L_GDPPC 3.76 0.58 -0.35 2.19 2.28 4.75 423 
Source: KILM, ILSS, Economic Freedom of the World and own calculation. 
 
Note: Description of Variables: INF = Informal Employment (as a percentage of total employment); REG 
= Index of Overall Regulation; CMR = Credit Market Regulation; LMR = Labour Market Regulation; BR 
= Business Regulation; LP = Index of Legal System and Property Rights;  
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